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NOTE
Where the Windfall Falls Short: “Appropriate Equitable
Relief” after Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.
I. Introduction
In June 1996, a motorcycle accident rendered twenty-four-year-old Shawn
Paris permanently brain damaged.1  In a settlement, Paris recovered $100,000
against the party responsible for his injuries.2  At the time of settlement,
medical bills incurred to treat Paris’ injuries exceeded $200,000.3  Paris’ health
plan, which paid the medical expenses, attempted to recover its expenditures
under a recoupment clause in the policy contract.  In response, Paris sought a
declaratory judgment that Maryland state law precluded his health plan from
collecting the settlement as reimbursement for medical bills resulting from his
accident.  Ruling that state law did not apply and finding no parallel federal
protection, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted
summary judgment against Paris and awarded the entire $100,000 settlement
to the health plan.4  This decision left Paris’ mother to furnish both the attorney
fees and a lifetime of costly medical expenses for her son, whom the district
court labeled “a disabled, destitute adult child.”5
Although this situation may seem shocking, sadly, it represents a common
occurrence.  In fact, insurance providers regularly insert subrogation and
reimbursement clauses in their policy contracts.6  These recoupment provisions
allow a plan fiduciary to recover money from an injured plan participant who
obtains damages through a settlement or judgment against a responsible third-
party tortfeasor or third-party insurer.7  Cash settlements recovered through
these provisions serve to repay the plan for past medical expenses resulting
from the participant’s injuries.8  Specifically, employer-provided insurance
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
234 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:233
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10. See infra Part II.A.
11. 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
12. Roger M. Baron, Public Policy Considerations Warranting Denial of Reimbursement
to ERISA Plans: It’s Time to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55 MERCER L. REV.
595, 596 (2004).
13. Mark A. Hoffman, Health Plan Wins Fight over Costs Recovery, Ruling Benefits
Employers, BUS. INS., May 22, 2006, at 1 (stating that the decision in Sereboff is “good news
for plans and the employers that sponsor them”).
plans are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).9  Although a majority of states have enacted protections preventing
or limiting insurers’ ability to enforce these reimbursement provisions, ERISA
preempts enforcement of such state-law protections against self-funded health
plans.10
In May 2006, the United States Supreme Court issued its latest decision in
the area of reimbursement and ERISA in the case of Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc.11  Until Sereboff, employer-provided insurance plans
were often denied the ability to collect reimbursement from injured plan
participants who had acquired third-party settlements.12  The Sereboff decision,
which the insurance industry heralded as a victory, simplified and expanded
the ability of health plans to obtain reimbursement.13  For attorneys who
represent injured plan participants, the outcome that Shawn Paris was forced
to accept seems destined for repetition in the wake of the Sereboff decision.
The Court’s opinion, however, does not clearly resolve how the funds must be
held to allow collection by the health plan through the available equitable
remedy.  This ambiguity and the absence of state-law protections result in an
ethical dilemma for attorneys representing the catastrophically injured, who
must attempt to both guard an undercompensated client’s settlement and
comply with the law.  These considerations, combined with public policy,
demand renewed consideration of whether, and under what circumstances,
courts should enforce health plan recoupment clauses.
This Note will highlight the unanswered questions, new dilemmas, and a
potential avenue of relief for injured plan participants resulting from the
Sereboff decision.  Part II will explore the legal background behind
recoupment under both state law and ERISA.  Part III will analyze and discuss
the decision in Sereboff.  Part IV will outline the facts behind the alleged
“windfall” to plan participants, the vast public policy against reimbursement
in many situations, and the legal and ethical challenges now facing those who
represent injured plan participants.  Based upon these findings, Part IV will
argue that analysis of the statute—and its restriction that health plans seeking
reimbursement may only obtain  “appropriate equitable relief”—must include
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14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004).
15. See Michelle J. d’Arcambal, The Assault on Subrogation, in ALI-ABA CONFERENCE
ON LIFE INSURANCE LITIGATION 461, 463 (ALI-ABA ed., 1997) (defining subrogation and
reimbursement).
16. Baron, supra note 12, at 602-03.
17. Id. at 603 (noting that “subrogation had been disallowed by virtually all courts until
recently”).
18. Id.
19. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The “Double Recovery”
Myth and the Feasibility of State Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1992)
(noting that Missouri, Arizona, Connecticut, Nevada, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma
adopt this view).
20. 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 223:134 (3d ed.
2000).
21. Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between Insured and Insurer in a
Subrogation Case, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 807 (1994) (reporting that Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have adopted
a determination of whether the relief sought is truly appropriate.  This note will
conclude in Part V.
II. Background
A. Subrogation and Reimbursement Generally
The principle of subrogation permits an insurer who has indemnified a
policyholder to assume legal standing in place of the policyholder to sue a
third-party tortfeasor on the policyholder’s claim for compensation.14
Reimbursement, by contrast, permits the insurer to assert a contractual right
to repayment out of the proceeds of an insured’s later recovery from a third
party.15  The concepts of subrogation and reimbursement for personal injury
claims “[are] of relatively recent origin, having only been developed in the last
thirty to forty years.”16
Historically, courts prohibited insurer subrogation in personal injury
claims.17  In the 1960s, however, insurers began successfully couching
subrogation clauses in terms of “reimbursement” to avoid the state laws
prohibiting subrogation.18  Despite this change in pleading, some states
continued to flatly reject an insurer’s claim to recoupment of personal injury
claims.19  Other jurisdictions applied the common law “make-whole doctrine,”
which limited an insurer’s ability to recover from a beneficiary by requiring
that the policyholder receive full compensation for any uninsured loss before
enforcement of the insurer’s recoupment rights.20  Twenty-five states have
adopted the make-whole doctrine.21  Another widespread limitation is the
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27. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
28. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (“Except as provided in [the savings clause], the
provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by ERISA].”).  
29. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
“common-fund doctrine,” which requires that the injured plan participant’s
attorney receive reimbursement before compensation of the plan through the
third-party settlement.22  Thus, more than half of the states, through total
refusal to enforce the provisions or limitations on recovery, challenge the
ability of an insurer to transfer its losses to an injured policyholder who
obtains a third-party recovery.
B. Subrogation and Preemption by ERISA
Although Congress enacted ERISA primarily to protect workers’ pension
benefits,23 the statute’s preemption language has extended into areas far
beyond Congress’s original intended purpose.  During its drafting, ERISA
came to encompass not only pension plans, but also medical and other
employee benefit plans.24  Unfortunately, Congress “gave very little explicit
consideration to the implications of this expansion.”25  Indeed, the preemption
language within ERISA remains one of the most perplexing and most litigated
portions of the statutory scheme.26
ERISA contains two provisions that have been held to preempt state laws.
First, ERISA provides express preemption language in section 514.27  Within
that section, three distinct clauses interact to form the express ERISA
preemption.  The “preemption clause” provides that ERISA “shall supersede
any and all State laws . . . [that] relate to any employee benefit plan.”28  The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause broadly, stating that
a state law relates to a benefit plan “in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan.”29  Next, the “savings clause”
exempts from preemption any state law “which regulates insurance, banking,
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34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
35. Bogan, supra note 26, at 110-11.
36. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)
(emphasis added).
37. Bogan, supra note 26, at 110-11.
or securities.”30  Finally, the “deemer clause” modifies the effect of the savings
clause by nullifying any state attempt to regulate a self-funded employee
benefit plan as if it were an insurance company.31  In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
the Supreme Court interpreted these complicated provisions of ERISA,
specifically the deemer clause, as exempting self-funded health plans from any
state laws dealing with subrogation rights.32  As a result, state law limitations
on recoupment do not apply to nearly half of all employer-provided benefit
plans.33
Courts have also applied an implied preemption analysis in ERISA claims
arising from the statute’s express civil enforcement scheme.  ERISA provides:
A civil action may be brought . . .
(3) by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.34
The Supreme Court has interpreted this enforcement scheme as providing
exclusive relief for plan fiduciaries.35  Section 502(a)(3) allows plan fiduciaries
to recover only “appropriate equitable relief.”36  In addition, the ERISA
express preemption language bars a fiduciary’s potential state law claim for
breach of contract.37  Consequently, the only option available to the plan
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40. See Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997) (indicating that
the make-whole doctrine should not be applied in ERISA cases); Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d
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fiduciary is to couch its recoupment action as a claim seeking equitable relief
under section 502(a)(3).38 
Although federal courts have subsumed ERISA plan recoupment actions,
the fate of the make-whole doctrine at the federal level remains unclear.  In
some situations, state laws enacting the make-whole doctrine survive
preemption by ERISA under the savings clause.39  The circuits have split over
whether to apply the make-whole doctrine as the default rule under federal
common law where the policy contract does not clearly prohibit such
application.40  Regardless, even jurisdictions that recognize the make-whole
doctrine as a default rule allow the plan language to expressly override the
protection.41  The possible absence of the make-whole doctrine at the federal
level has thereby generated continued debate on what constitutes appropriate
equitable relief for the purposes of the statute.
C. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court issued its first decision dealing
with the scope of appropriate equitable relief under ERISA section 502(a)(3).
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,42 plan participants sought compensation for
an alleged breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty that resulted in the loss of a
significant part of their pension benefits.43  The policyholders brought a claim
under section 502(a)(3) asserting that the relief they sought qualified as
“appropriate equitable relief” due to “ERISA’s roots in the common law of
trusts.”44 
Ruling five to four, the Court discredited the plan participants’ argument.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, succinctly stated that
“[a]lthough they often dance around the word, what petitioners in fact seek is
nothing other than compensatory damages—monetary relief for all losses their
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45. Id.
46. Id. at 255-56.
47. Id. at 255.
48. Id. at 256.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 262.
51. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
52. Id. at 207-08.
53. Id. at 207.
54. Id.
55. Id.
plan sustained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.  Money
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”45
The Court acknowledged that, at common law, the courts of equity had
exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach of
trust and that those courts typically permitted the recovery of money
damages.46  The Court further noted, however, that although courts of equity
might hear such claims, such claims nevertheless constituted an adjudication
of legal rights and legal remedies.47  The Court’s majority opinion recognized
that “equitable relief” had two possible meanings.  First, Congress may have
intended the term to reference “whatever relief a court of equity is empowered
to provide in a particular case.”48  Alternatively, the Court noted that equitable
relief could also refer to the types of relief typically available at equity,
including “injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages.”49  Based in part on the determination that Congress could not have
intended equitable relief to mean all relief, the five-member majority adopted
the limited view of equitable relief.50  Despite the Court’s own admission that
this meaning was increasingly unlikely, the Court limited equitable relief for
the purposes of section 502(a)(3) to those remedies that the Court interpreted
as typically available at equity.
D. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
The Court faced the issue of defining appropriate equitable relief again in
the 2002 case of Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.51  The
Knudson case involved a lawsuit, brought under ERISA section 502(a)(3), to
recover medical benefits pursuant to a recoupment provision.52  The
beneficiary, Janette Knudson, became a quadriplegic following an automobile
accident.53  Great-West, acting as claims administrator for a self-funded
medical plan, paid $411,157 in medical expenses.54  Knudson sued the car
manufacturer on a products liability claim and ultimately settled for
$650,000.55  Pursuant to California law, the state court placed a portion of the
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60. Id. at 210 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)) (internal
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61. Id. at 210-11.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 213 (citing Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
64. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1936)).
settlement proceeds in a special needs trust established for Knudson.56  The
court distributed the remainder of the settlement between Knudson’s attorney,
California Medicaid, and specifically, by a check to Great-West in the amount
of $13,828.57  Seeking reimbursement for the entirety of the medical expenses
paid, Great-West refused to cash the check and sued Knudson under ERISA
section 502(a)(3).58  Notably, Great-West failed to appeal the denial of the
motion to add the special needs trust that held the majority of the product
liability settlement funds as a defendant.59
In another five to four decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court clarified its Mertens decision.  The Court stated that as used in ERISA,
the term equitable relief “must refer to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity.”60  The Court rejected Great-West’s argument that
seeking an injunction or restitution to recover money owed to the plan
constituted equitable relief.61  The Court noted that “an injunction to compel
the payment of money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a
past due monetary obligation, was not typically available in equity.”62
Consequently, the Court held that the form of restitution sought by Great-West
did not qualify as “equitable relief.”  The Court distinguished between legal
and equitable restitution, stating that the distinction hinged on the “basis for
[the plaintiff’s] claim and the nature of the underlying remedies sought.”63
Under the Court’s rubric, legal restitution occurred where the plaintiff sought
to “obtain a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant
to pay a sum of money.”64
As a corollary, the Court then explained when restitution would qualify as
an equitable remedy:
In contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in
the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money
or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the
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67. Id. at 213-14.
68. Id.; Cowart, supra note 6, at 605.
69. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 220.
72. David D. Leishman, Note, Adding Insult to Injury: ERISA, Knudson, and the Error of
the Possession Theory, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1214, 1223-26 (2005) (noting that “[c]ourts in the
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73. Id. at 1220.
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plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in
the defendant’s possession.65
Therefore, where the Court could identify property belonging to the plaintiff
and trace it into the defendant’s hands, the Court could impose a constructive
trust.66  In contrast, if the property had dissipated to the extent that no
identifiable product remained, the plaintiff’s claim shifted to one for general
money damages, or legal relief.67  Under those circumstances, the plaintiff
could not enforce an equitable lien or constructive trust.68
In Knudson, the plan participant no longer controlled the funds.  Following
the third-party settlement, they were distributed to the special needs trust and
to Knudson’s attorney.69  Because the health plan did not appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion to amend the complaint to add these individuals
as co-defendants, the United States Supreme Court did not consider whether
Great-West could have sought equitable relief against Knudson’s attorney and
the trustee of the special needs trust.70  In Knudson, the Court held that Great-
West sought legal rather than equitable relief, and as a result, the Court denied
reimbursement.71
E. The Circuit Split After Knudson
Following Knudson, the majority of circuits interpreted the dicta in that
decision as opening the door to claims by health plans for equitable relief
through constructive trusts or equitable liens.  In fact, nearly every circuit after
the Knudson decision followed what would become known as the “possession
theory.”72  The possession theory allows recovery where funds in the actual or
constructive possession of a plan beneficiary are traceable to money or
property identified as belonging in good conscience to the ERISA plan.73
Where this occurs, the plan may seek a constructive trust or equitable lien as
other equitable relief available under ERISA.74
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The test most cited for the possession theory originated in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.  In Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan
v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough,75 the Fifth Circuit found that when the
participant’s attorney had identifiable settlement funds in a trust account, the
plan’s action against the participant’s law firm did not seek to impose personal
liability on the participant or his counsel, but rather to impose a constructive
trust, and thus fell subject to suit under ERISA section 502(a)(3).  In its
analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that an ERISA insurer may impose a
constructive trust or equitable lien upon specifically identifiable funds that
belong in good conscience to the plan and that are within the possession and
control of the plan participant.76  
In nearly all cases where the plan sought damages from a specifically
identifiable fund of money traceable to a third-party settlement, courts would
allow the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien under ERISA
section 502(a)(3).77  Furthermore, courts construed the possession theory
broadly, allowing the plan to trace funds into a beneficiary’s bank account,78
trust account,79 or to the third-party tortfeasor’s attorney.80
Nevertheless, the Sixth and Ninth circuits declined to follow the possession
theory in the Knudson dicta.81  These circuits generally refused to validate plan
or plan fiduciary attempts to assert equitable claims, finding “the spirit, if not
the letter, of the request to be [for legal relief].”82  As a result, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to solve this dispute between the circuits.  In Sereboff
v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the Supreme Court intended to clarify
under what facts health plans could assert a constructive trust or equitable lien,
allowing the claim to fall under ERISA’s requirement that claims seek
appropriate equitable relief.
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III. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.
A. Statement of the Case
On June 22, 2000, Joel and Marlene Sereboff suffered injuries in an
automobile accident in California.83  The Sereboffs were beneficiaries under
a self-funded health plan administered by Mid Atlantic Medical Services,
Inc.84  Accordingly, the Sereboffs’ plan with Mid Atlantic provided for
payment of certain covered medical expenses.  The plan also contained an
“Acts of Third Parties” provision, requiring that a participant who received
benefits under the plan must fully reimburse Mid Atlantic from any recoveries
obtained from a third-party tortfeasor.85  Furthermore, the provision required
reimbursement of funds to Mid Atlantic regardless of whether the third-party
had fully compensated the plan participant for their injuries, unless Mid
Atlantic agreed in writing to a reduction.86  This final provision would,
arguably, preclude a contracting party from asserting a make-whole defense
as a matter of ERISA common law.
After the Sereboffs’ accident, Mid Atlantic paid their medical expenses,
totaling $74,869.37.87  Subsequently, the Sereboffs filed a tort action in state
court against several third parties, seeking compensatory damages for injuries
suffered as a result of the accident.88  Soon after the Sereboffs initiated their
suit, Mid Atlantic sent the Sereboffs’ attorney a letter asserting a “lien” on the
anticipated proceeds of the suit.  The asserted lien sought the medical expenses
Mid Atlantic paid on the Sereboffs’ behalf.89  During the course of the
litigation, Mid Atlantic sent the Sereboffs details of the medical expenses as
they accrued and were paid, and repeated its claim to a lien on a portion of the
beneficiaries’ recovery.90
The Sereboffs’ litigation with the third parties resulted in a settlement of
$750,000.91  When the Sereboffs refused to pay Mid Atlantic any of the
settlement proceeds, Mid Atlantic sued the Sereboffs in federal district court
under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.92  Additionally, Mid Atlantic sought a
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temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the
beneficiaries to retain and set aside at least $74,869.37 from the settlement
proceeds.93  The Sereboffs and their counsel agreed to preserve the disputed
amount in a separate, segregated investment account until the district court
ruled on the merits of the case and the Sereboffs’ exhausted all appeals.94
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland entered
summary judgment for Mid Atlantic and ordered the Sereboffs to pay the
$74,869.37, plus interest, with a deduction for Mid Atlantic’s share of the
attorney fees and court costs the Sereboffs incurred in state court.95  The judge
later awarded attorney fees to Mid Atlantic for expenses incurred in obtaining
reimbursement.96  The Sereboffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.97  In the opinion, the Fourth
Circuit noted the split in the circuits on the issue of whether section 502(a)(3)
authorizes recovery under the circumstances present in Sereboff.98  The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
circuits.
B. Issue and Holding
The Court observed that a fiduciary may bring a civil action under section
502(a)(3) to obtain appropriate equitable relief to redress or enforce violations
of ERISA provisions or the terms of the plan.  The Court further observed that
Mid Atlantic qualified as a fiduciary under ERISA and that it filed suit in
district court to enforce the terms of the Acts of Third Parties provision.
Therefore, the Court found the only true question for review was whether the
relief Mid Atlantic’s suit requested constituted appropriate equitable relief
under section 502(a)(3).99
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court held that the type of relief sought by Mid Atlantic properly constituted
equitable relief as contemplated by ERISA section 503(a)(3).100
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C. Rationale of the Court
The Court began its analysis by comparing the Sereboff’s situation to that
of its prior decision in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.
The Court identified that the key distinction between Sereboff and Knudson
was the way the plan enforced the reimbursement clause.  Applying the earlier
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, the Court stated that equitable relief
consisted of “those categories of relief that were typically available in
equity.”101  The Court explained that the imposition of a constructive trust or
equitable lien on particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession
constituted one traditionally recognized form of equitable restitution, as
established by the dicta in Knudson.102  The funds in Knudson did not meet this
requirement because the funds that petitioners sought were held by the state
in a special needs trust and therefore not in Knudson’s possession.  In contrast,
the Court noted that the “impediment to characterizing the relief in Knudson
as equitable is not present” in the Sereboffs’ case.103  Mid Atlantic sought
specifically identifiable funds reserved from the third-party settlement in a
segregated investment account pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by the
Sereboffs and their lawyer.  Thus, the Court distinguished the situation in
Sereboff from the earlier decision in Knudson, a case with facts admittedly
“similar to those in [Sereboff].”104
After distinguishing the facts of Sereboff from Knudson, the Court
evaluated whether Mid Atlantic had adequately established the equitable basis
for its claim.  In making this evaluation, the Court revisited a 1914 opinion
“from the days of the divided bench.”105  In Barnes v. Alexander,106 two
attorneys performed work for a third, in exchange for one third of the expected
contingent fee.107  In upholding their equitable claim, Justice Holmes recited
“the familiar rule[] of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even
before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title
to the thing.”108  On the basis of this rule, Justice Holmes concluded that
Barnes’ undertaking “create[d] a lien” upon the portion of the monetary
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recovery due Barnes from the client, which Street and Alexander could
“follow . . . into the hands of . . . Barnes” once the fund was identified.109
Applying the Barnes decision to the matter at hand, the Court found that
Mid Atlantic had properly followed the steps established in Barnes.  The Acts
of Third Parties provision “specifically identified a particular fund, distinct
from the Sereboffs’ general assets.”110  Therefore, as in Barnes, Mid Atlantic
could successfully follow a portion of the settlement funds into the Sereboffs’
hands once the fund was identified and impose on that portion a constructive
trust or equitable lien.111
The Court rejected the beneficiaries’ contention that Knudson and Barnes
imposed a strict “tracing requirement” on all recoveries.112  Tracing would
require that Mid Atlantic directly trace the funds it sought to recover to funds
received in the third-party settlement identified in the plan contract.  In
rejecting this claim, the Court distinguished “an equitable lien sought as a
matter of restitution” and an equitable lien imposed “by agreement.”113
Historically, only the former required strict tracing at equity, and the Court
declined to apply all the restitutionary conditions to enforcement of an
equitable lien by agreement under section 502(a)(3).114  In addition, the Court
dismissed the beneficiaries’ contention that the fund must exist at the time of
equitable lien agreement formation.115  Thus, the fact that no third-party
recovery existed at the time of plan document execution did not impede the
creation of an equitable lien by agreement.116
D. The Failed Defense: Appropriate Equitable Relief
Finally, the Sereboffs contended that the lower courts erred in allowing the
enforcement of the Acts of Third Parties provision without imposing
traditional limitations on subrogation.117  The Sereboffs argued that they
should have the ability to assert equitable defenses in an equitable subrogation
action, such as the defense that the plan may pursue subrogation only in the
case of a fully compensated victim.118  The Court, however, found that Mid
Atlantic’s claim to enforce the Acts of Third Parties provision qualified as an
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equitable lien established by agreement.119  Therefore, Mid Atlantic did not
need to characterize its claim as a freestanding action for equitable
subrogation.120  The Court characterized the equitable subrogation defenses the
Sereboffs claimed accompanied such an action as “beside the point.”121
Alternatively, the Sereboffs argued that, even if the relief Mid Atlantic
sought qualified as “equitable” under section 502(a)(3), it was not
“appropriate” under that provision because it contravened principles such as
the make-whole doctrine.122  To their detriment, the Sereboffs did not raise the
assertion that Mid Atlantic’s claim was not “appropriate” apart from the
contention that it did not qualify as “equitable” in the lower courts.123
Therefore, the Court declined to determine this issue in the first instance.124
IV. Analysis
A. Response to the Decision
At a mere eleven pages long and containing only two footnotes, one
commentator declared the unanimous Sereboff opinion “a breath of fresh air”
in comparison to the much longer and divided decision in Great-West.125
Although Sereboff eliminated some of the confusion created by Great-West,
ambiguity in the opinion rendered the decision a “subtle change” rather than
a total simplification of ERISA and reimbursement.126
Following the decision, three areas remain unclear.  First, the Court did not
explicitly delineate what steps are necessary to create an equitable lien by
agreement.  Theoretically, the plan could establish an equitable lien by
agreement simply through execution of an Acts of Third Parties
reimbursement clause.  Alternatively, the equitable lien by agreement may
require a separate agreement or court order to preserve a specified amount in
a segregated account, as in Sereboff.127  Next, the opinion did not state how the
funds that the plan seeks to recover must be identified or held.128  In Sereboff,
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third reason, that of ultimately reducing insurance rates by virtue of subrogated recoveries by
the Court found that Mid Atlantic occupied a stronger position than that of
Great-West because Mid Atlantic sought recovery of a specifically identified
fund within the Sereboffs’ control.129  Nevertheless, it appears that
circumstances still remain where the plan may fail to reach the third-party
settlement proceeds because of the lack of a segregated investment account or
where the participant does not possess the settlement funds.  Finally, because
the Sereboffs did not raise the argument until the final appeal, the Court did
not address whether it is “appropriate” within the meaning of 502(a)(3) to
grant a health plan reimbursement from the settlement funds of an
undercompensated plan participant.130  Because the Court in Sereboff declared
the traditional subrogation defenses such as the make-whole doctrine “beside
the point,” this particular unanswered question offers potential hope for plan
participants.  Despite the complicated questions the Sereboff opinion created,
the Sereboff decision elicited the same simple and decisive response from both
the insurance companies and plan participants: act fast to catch the windfall.
B. The Problem: Where the Windfall Falls Short
The insurance industry presents several arguments to support collecting
reimbursement from third-party settlements.  The insurance companies
maintain that, in the absence of reimbursement, plan participants benefit from
a “windfall.”  Insurers suggest that plan participants have their medical bills
paid for them twice; once by the plan and again as an element of damages
recovered in the third-party settlement.131  In addition, insurance carriers assert
that they rely on reimbursement proceeds to reduce costs and premiums.132
According to America’s Health Insurance Plans, a national trade association
of health insurers, reimbursement helps plans recoup more than one billion
dollars annually.133 
In response, plan participants argue that insurance companies do not use
recoupment proceeds to reduce premiums.134  In fact, “[i]nsurers consistently
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142. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of
Petitioners at 21, Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006) (No. 05-260),
2006 WL 165866 [hereinafter ATLA Brief].  
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979); see also id. § 920A(2) cmt. b
(“[I]t is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should not be
shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor.  If the plaintiff was himself responsible for
fail to introduce the factor of such recoveries into rate-determining formulae,
but rather apply such recoveries to increasing dividends to shareholders.”135
Furthermore, policyholders assert that they pay premiums “to cover their risk
of paying medical expenses.”136  Most importantly, for injured policyholders
suffering from severe and life-long injuries, the disputed “windfall” sought
through reimbursement often simply does not exist.
1. For The Severely Injured, The Loss of a Windfall or Financial
Security?
In almost every case, a severely injured plan participant will never be made
fully whole.  Unfortunately, in the vast majority of critical injury cases, “the
insured is left not only seriously impaired for life, but, if reimbursement is
permitted, the insured is also left financially destitute.”137  The policy against
double recovery by plan participants arose in the context of property insurance,
where a court may ascertain the damage suffered by a property owner with
reasonable accuracy.138  In personal injury cases, however, an injured plan
participant will often not receive adequate compensation.139  This deficient
compensation results from a variety of factors.
First, the calculation of damages in a personal injury action presents unique
challenges.  Damages often include “permanent disability, mental anguish,
physical pain, loss of income, and future aspects of each of these
components.”140  Unlike property damages, courts encounter difficulties in
accurately estimating the economic value of these complicated injuries.141  In
many jurisdictions, state tort reform initiatives have further restricted personal
injury awards.  Many states have limited or abolished the collateral-source
rule,142 which requires a tortfeasor in a personal injury action to compensate
a prevailing plaintiff for medical expenses, regardless of whether those
expenses were covered by the plaintiff’s health plan or insurer.143  Moreover,
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tort reform has led to damage caps on awards for non-economic damages.144
In some states, the law may not permit recovery of some elements, such as the
future aspect of certain damages.145  Finally, most personal injury cases end in
settlement.146  These third-party settlements rarely result in full compensation
for the victim.147
Several factors may lead to the victim’s acceptance of less than full
compensation in a settlement agreement.  Most prominently, the plaintiff may
agree to accept less than full compensation to avoid the cost and delay of
litigation.148  Additionally, tortfeasor liability could involve assertions of
contributory negligence on the part of the victim as well as a number of other
factors that could complicate or dispute the liability.149  Often, victims accept
less than full compensation because the tortfeasor has inadequate insurance
coverage or assets to cover the actual damages.150  Once the parties finally
reach an agreement, attorney fees and the extensive costs of litigation will
generally reduce the victim’s recovery by at least one-third.151  Consequently,
even where a seriously injured policyholder receives a large settlement, this
award seldom represents a “windfall.”152
In Sereboff, Joel and Marlene Sereboff’s medical expenses sought by the
health plan totaled $74,869.37.  The Sereboffs received $750,000 from the
third-party settlement.  Although the record provides limited information about
the Sereboffs’ injuries, the settlement on its face seems adequate to
compensate both the health plan and the Sereboffs.  Nevertheless, Supreme
Court jurisprudence contains many examples where third-party settlements
clearly fell short of fully compensating the victim’s injuries.
In Knudson, discussed above, Janette Knudson suffered severe injuries in
a car accident that rendered her quadriplegic.153  Knudson reached a settlement
against several parties responsible for her accident.  After reducing the total
settlement amount by attorney fees, Medicaid fees, and a $13,828 payment to
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Great-West, Knudson received an award of $256,745.154  Although Great-West
failed to reach Knudson’s funds because of the special needs trust, the loss of
this recovery would have resulted in disastrous consequences for Knudson.
The California state court estimated that Knudson faced $2,593,900 in future
medical expenses and $819,829 in lost future earnings.155  Furthermore, Janette
Knudson served as the sole provider for her nine-year-old daughter.156
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,157 fifteen-year-old Cynthia Holliday suffered
serious and permanent injuries in an automobile accident.158  As a result,
Holliday recovered $49,825 in a settlement with the third-party tortfeasor.159
This award represented the maximum amount available to Holliday under the
driver’s liability policy.160  At the time of the lawsuit, Holliday’s medical
expenses exceeded $178,000.161  Her injuries, including a skull fracture,
resulted in permanent brain damage that affected both her motor and cognitive
functions.162  The extent and permanency of her injuries, combined with her
age, assured substantial costs for Holliday’s future medical care.163  The
ERISA plan that paid a portion of her medical expenses sued Holliday for the
entire balance of the settlement.164  Interpreting the express preemption
language, the Supreme Court determined that Holliday’s self-funded health
plan could not be “deemed” an insurer.165  Therefore, the Court held that
ERISA preempted Pennsylvania’s anti-subrogation statute and awarded the
entire third-party settlement to the health plan.166  Cynthia Holliday retained
nothing from her settlement to compensate for her extensive past or future
injuries.
In cases such as Great-West and Holliday, where victims suffer severe and
permanent injuries, the entire concept of a windfall rings hollow.  As a result,
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the controversy should shift, in a pragmatic way, to consider which party
should bear the burden of the shortcomings.
2. Where the Windfall Falls Short, Who Should Bear the Burden?
The argument that the insurance company should not receive reimbursement
to the detriment of a severely injured and undercompensated policyholder
gains support from a collection of public policy arguments with such
gravamen that one commentator referred to them as the “[e]lephant in the
[c]ourtroom.”167  When considering who should bear the burden, public policy
clearly favors protecting the injured plan participant, “who exhibited the
foresight and prudence to acquire insurance in the first place.”168  That view
prevails in the states, which historically regulated the field of insurance law,
as evidenced by the presence of common law limitations on subrogation in
most states.169
In addition, some argue that courts should not enforce reimbursement
provisions because of their unilateral nature.  In non-insured ERISA plans, for
example, the health plan may freely draft and amend the reimbursement
language inserted into the policy agreement.170  Further, these policy contracts
do not fall under any bargaining, administrative, or judicial authority.171  The
complete control exercised by the ERISA sponsors and plan insurers has led
some to refer to the reimbursement agreements as mere “contracts of
adhesion.”172
Finally, ERISA’s stated purpose argues against such injustice to severely
injured policyholders.  In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA in response to a
national crisis involving the widespread abuse of pension funds by employers
that left many workers without retirement benefits.173  In drafting ERISA,
Congress found motivation in “the absolute need that safeguards for plan
participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to prevent the numerous
inequities to workers under plans which have resulted in tragic hardship to so
many.”174  Proper interpretation of the statute requires deference to the group
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss1/5
2008] NOTES 253
175. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (citing Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
176. See supra Part IV.A.
177. Popowski v. Parrott, 461 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2006) (contrasting
reimbursement agreement language used by two different ERISA plan providers in a
consolidated case, finding one allowed reimbursement and one did not).
178. Gerard Sinzdak, Recent Cases, Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.: The
Supreme Court’s Current View on the Enforceability of Third-Party Reimbursement Clauses
Under ERISA, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 523, 529 (2006) (citing Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).
179. C. Mark Humbert, The Supreme Court Revisits Third-Party Reimbursement Claims
Under ERISA: Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2006, at
1, 4.
180. Id.
181. A Georgia Lawyer, http://ageorgialawyer.blogspot.com/2006/05/erisa-sereboff-deci
sion-and-work.html (May 16, 2006, 07:21 EST).
it sought to protect, “employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans.”175
3. The Added Quandary for Advisors of Injured Plan Participants
To the delight of the insurance industry,176 the Court in Sereboff firmly
established the enforceability of reimbursement clauses under ERISA.
Subsequent lawsuits have provided insight into the “magic words” needed for
effective Acts of Third Parties provisions, thereby sending insurance
companies scrambling to review and possibly revise their contract language.177
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that an equitable claim may only arise
where “the property sought to be recovered or its proceeds have [not] been
dissipated.”178  In order to guarantee the plan’s ability to recover, the insurance
industry advises health plans to act quickly once a plan beneficiary obtains a
third-party judgment or settlement.179  Such diligence requires that the
insurance companies engage in close monitoring to ensure that the recovery
is not dissipated or placed beyond the possession of the beneficiary.180
In contrast, the Sereboff decision caused concern for those who represent
injured plan participants.  Faced with plans’ expanded capability to seek third-
party settlement funds and the lack of common law subrogation defenses,
those who represent policyholders sought novel measures to protect their
clients—especially those with “catastrophic injuries and limited insurance”—
from losing third-party settlement proceeds.181  A prominent labor law journal
advises that policyholders seeking to avoid reimbursement may possibly
achieve this by “depositing settlement funds in trust accounts or other assets
that place the funds outside [the plan participant’s] possession and control,”
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thereby replicating the situation present in Knudson.182  Another attorney
postulates that issuance of the settlement check in the names of both the
attorney and the client, thus avoiding clear possession of the funds by the
injured policyholder, might prevent reimbursement.183  An additional—yet
troubling—possibility, revealed anecdotally, allows the plan participant to
avoid possession through a quick transfer of settlement funds to an off-shore
account.184
All of these options present possible ethical conflicts for those who
represent injured plan participants.  Clearly, attorneys have a duty not to assist
clients in committing fraud; however, attorneys for plan participants also bear
a duty to advocate on behalf of their clients.185  Many cases suggest that
attorneys will not face liability for failure to pay reimbursement to an ERISA
plan from a third-party recovery in a personal injury action.186  Nevertheless,
courts have yet to conclusively settle the issue,187 and attorneys continue to
confront the issue.  In situations involving severely injured plan participants
where the third-party settlement has left the victims undercompensated for
their injuries, an attorney’s failure to protect their client by avoiding clear
possession of settlement funds seems unethical.
C. A Solution: “Appropriate Equitable Relief” Must Be Appropriate
A potential solution for protecting severely injured plan participants who
are not made whole by third-party settlements lies in the Sereboffs’ untimely
defense.188  As discussed, ERISA section 502(a)(3) allows health plans to seek
“appropriate equitable relief.”189  Fundamentally, the Court in Sereboff sought
to define “equitable” for the purpose of this section.  Nonetheless, in
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examining the availability of relief under the language of the statute, courts
should consider not only the “equitable” nature of the desired remedy but also
whether the remedy seems appropriate.  As the petitioners in Sereboff
asserted, this limitation “serves as an essential judicial check.”190
The petitioners, in arguing the importance of the modifier “appropriate,”
pointed to a previous case where the Court emphasized this qualification.  In
Varity Corp. v. Howe,191 the Court found that section 502(a)(3) operates as a
“catchall provision[] . . . to act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable
relief for injuries caused by violations that [section] 502 does not elsewhere
adequately remedy.”192  Because the relief sought by the respondents in Varity
Corp. undisputedly constituted equitable relief, the Court considered the issue
of whether the relief was appropriate in light of the apparent lack of alternative
remedies.193  The Court stated that such a determination must respect “the
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans, and . . . the policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others."194
Under the analysis in Varity Corp., reimbursement sought by health plans
in the case of a severely injured and undercompensated plaintiff does not
qualify as “appropriate.”  In the Sereboff case, the ERISA plan argued, and the
district court agreed, that the make-whole doctrine did not apply because the
reimbursement agreement specifically disclaimed it.195  The Court in Varity
Corp., however, required consideration of not only the plan language, but also
the underlying public policy.  Twenty-five of the states that allow subrogation
apply the make-whole doctrine to protect severely injured policyholders from
the extreme inequity that results when subrogation strips them of their
settlement proceeds.196  When weighing appropriateness, courts should not
disclaim such a widely accepted and well supported limitation on
reimbursement simply because the plan language dismisses it.  Consideration
of whether the plaintiff has received adequate compensation, combined with
the other arguments for limiting recoupment, must enter the analysis of
whether relief sought through reimbursement qualifies under section 502(a)(3).
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Such consideration does not require complicated legal analysis; in fact, such
analysis requires mere common sense.
V. Conclusion
Since the decision in Sereboff, the United States Congress, backed by the
insurance lobby, attempted to create a new federal cause of action under
ERISA that would definitively place insurers first in line to collect
reimbursement from settlement funds, regardless of whether the victim
receives adequate compensation.197  Similarly, in a footnote, one lower court
already dismissed any arguments of reimbursement “appropriateness” where
the plaintiff has not been made whole.198  With Sereboff, the Court has allowed
health plans to pursue recoupment under ERISA despite general state refusal
to enforce such subrogation provisions.  In addition, the Court has set aside
typical state-law protections for injured policyholders, including the make-
whole doctrine.  The issues presented by the Sereboff decision require courts
to re-examine the ERISA statute’s clear language to determine whether the
remedies sought by the health plans adequately qualify for the available
remedy.  Health plans seek reimbursement as “appropriate equitable relief”
through ERISA.  Although Sereboff characterizes the relief sought as
equitable, this determination should not end the analysis.  The relief must also
be appropriate.  The modifier “appropriate” requires relief “suitably fitting” for
a particular purpose.199  Is awarding a $100,000 third-party settlement to an
ERISA health plan where the victim has sustained severe and lifelong injuries
truly “appropriate?”200  As courts explore this new terrain, we can only hope
that the issues surrounding the windfall debate will lead to careful
consideration of not only equitable, but also appropriate relief.
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